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Abstract—Voice has become an increasingly popular User
Interaction (UI) channel, mainly contributing to the ongoing
trend of wearables, smart vehicles, and home automation systems.
Voice assistants such as Siri, Google Now and Cortana, have
become our everyday fixtures, especially in scenarios where touch
interfaces are inconvenient or even dangerous to use, such as
driving or exercising. Nevertheless, the open nature of the voice
channel makes voice assistants difficult to secure and exposed
to various attacks as demonstrated by security researchers. In
this paper, we present VAuth, the first system that provides
continuous and usable authentication for voice assistants. We
design VAuth to fit in various widely-adopted wearable devices,
such as eyeglasses, earphones/buds and necklaces, where it col-
lects the body-surface vibrations of the user and matches it with
the speech signal received by the voice assistant’s microphone.
VAuth guarantees that the voice assistant executes only the
commands that originate from the voice of the owner. We have
evaluated VAuth with 18 users and 30 voice commands and
find it to achieve an almost perfect matching accuracy with less
than 0.1% false positive rate, regardless of VAuth’s position on
the body and the user’s language, accent or mobility. VAuth
successfully thwarts different practical attacks, such as replayed
attacks, mangled voice attacks, or impersonation attacks. It also
has low energy and latency overheads and is compatible with
most existing voice assistants.
I. INTRODUCTION
Siri, Cortana, Google Now, and Alexa are becoming our
everyday fixtures. Through voice interactions, these and other
voice assistants allow us to place phone calls, send messages,
check emails, schedule appointments, navigate to destinations,
control smart appliances, and perform banking services. In
numerous scenarios such as cooking, exercising or driving,
voice interaction is preferable to traditional touch interfaces
that are inconvenient or even dangerous to use. Furthermore,
a voice interface is even essential for the increasingly prevalent
Internet of Things (IoT) devices that lack touch capabili-
ties [1].
With sound being an open channel, voice as an input
mechanism is inherently insecure as it is prone to replay,
sensitive to noise, and easy to impersonate. Existing voice
authentication mechanisms, such as Google’s “Trusted Voice”
and Nuance’s “FreeSpeech” used by banks,1 fail to provide the
security features for voice assistant systems. An adversary can
bypass these voice-as-biometric authentication mechanisms by
impersonating the user’s voice or simply launching a replay
attack. Recent studies have demonstrated that it is possible
to inject voice commands remotely with mangled voice [2,
1https://wealth.barclays.com/en gb/home/international-banking/
insight-research/manage-your-money/banking-on-the-power-of-
speech.html
3], wireless signals [4], or through public radio stations [5]
without raising the user’s attention. Even Google warns against
its voice authentication feature as being insecure,2 and some
security companies [6] recommend relinquishing voice in-
terfaces all together until security issues are resolved. The
implications of attacking voice-assistant systems can be severe,
ranging from information theft and financial loss [7] all the
way to inflicting physical harm via unauthorized access to
smart appliances and vehicles.
In this paper, we propose VAuth, a novel system that pro-
vides usable and continuous authentication for voice assistant
systems. As a wearable security token, it supports on-going
authentication by matching the user’s voice with an additional
channel that provides physical assurance. VAuth collects the
body-surface vibrations of a user via an accelerometer and
continuously matches them to the voice commands received
by the voice assistant. This way, VAuth guarantees that the
voice assistant executes only the commands that originate from
the voice of the owner. VAuth offers the following salient
features.
Continuous Authentication: VAuth specifically ad-
dresses the problem of continuous authentication of a speaker
to a voice-enabled device. Most authentication mechanisms,
including all smartphone-specific ones such as passwords,
PINs, patterns, and fingerprints, provide security by proving
the user’s identity before establishing a session. They hinge on
one underlying assumption: the user retains exclusive control
of the device right after the authentication. While such an
assumption is natural for touch interfaces, it is unrealistic
for the case of voice assistants. Voice allows access for any
third party during a communication session, rendering pre-
session authentication insufficient. VAuth provides ongoing
speaker authentication during an entire session by ensuring
that every speech sample recorded by the voice assistant
originates from the speaker’s throat. Thus, VAuth comple-
ments existing mechanisms of initial session authentication
and speaker recognition.
Improved Security Features: Existing biometric-based
authentication approaches tries to reduce time-domain signals
to a set of vocal features. Regardless of how descriptive the
features are of the speech signal, they still represent a pro-
jection of the signal to a reduced-dimension space. Therefore,
collisions are bound to happen; two different signals can result
2When a user tries to enable Trusted Voice on Nexus devices,
Google explicitly warns that it is less secure than password and can
be exploited by the attacker with a very similar voice.
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in the same feature vector. For example, Tavish et al. [2]
fabricated mangled voice segments, incomprehensible to a
human, but map to the same feature vector as a voice command
so that they are recognizable by a voice assistant. Such attacks
weaken the security guarantees provided by almost all voice-
biometric approaches [8].
In contrast, VAuth utilizes an instantaneous matching al-
gorithm to compare the entire signal from accelerometer with
that of microphone in the time domain. VAuth splits both
accelerometer and microphone signals into speech segments
and proceeds to match both signals one segment at a time.
It filters the non-matching segments from the microphone
signal and only passes the matching ones to the voice assis-
tant. Our theoretical analysis of VAuth’s matching algorithm
(section VIII) demonstrates that it prevents an attacker from
injecting any command even when the user is speaking.
Moreover, VAuth overcomes the security problems of leaked
or stolen voice biometric information, such as voiceprints. A
voice biometric is a lifetime property of an individual, and
leaking it renders voice authentication insecure. On the other
hand, when losing VAuth for any reason, the user has to just
unpair the token and pair a new one.
Usability: A user can use VAuth out-of-the-box as it
does not require any user-specific training, a drastic departure
from existing voice biometric mechanisms. It only depends on
the instantaneous consistency between the accelerometer and
microphone signals; therefore, it is immune to voice changes
over time and in different situations, such as sickness or
tiredness. VAuth provides its security features as long as it
touches the user’s skin at any position on the facial, throat,
and sternum3 areas. This allows us to incorporate VAuth
into wearables that people are already using on a daily basis,
such as eyeglasses, Bluetooth earbuds and necklaces/lockets.
Our usability survey of 952 individuals revealed that users
are willing to accept the different configurations of VAuth,
especially when they are concerned about the security threats
and when VAuth comes in the forms of which they are already
comfortable.
We have implemented a prototype of VAuth using a com-
modity accelerometer and an off-the-shelf Bluetooth transmit-
ter. Our implementation is built into the Google Now system
in Android, and could easily extend to other platforms such as
Cortana, Siri, or even phone banking services. To demonstrate
the effectiveness of VAuth, we recruited 18 participants and
asked each of them to issue 30 different voice commands
using VAuth. We repeated the experiments for three wearable
scenarios: eyeglasses, earbuds and necklace. We found that
VAuth:
• delivers almost perfect results with more than 97% detec-
tion accuracy and close to 0 false positives. This indicates
most of the commands are correctly authenticated from
the first trial and VAuth only matches the command that
originates from the owner;
3The sternum is the bone that connects the rib cage; it vibrates as a result
of the speech.
• works out-of-the-box regardless of variation in accents,
mobility patterns (still vs. jogging), or even across lan-
guages (Arabic, Chinese, English, Korean, Persian);
• effectively thwarts mangling voice attacks and success-
fully blocks unauthenticated voice commands replayed
by an attacker or impersonated by other users; and
• incurs negligible latency (an average of 300ms) and en-
ergy overhead (requiring re-charging only once a week).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
discusses the related work while Section III provides the
necessary background of human speech models. Section IV
states the system and threat models and Section V details
the design and implementation of VAuth. We discuss our
matching algorithm in Section VI, and conduct phonetic-level
analysis on the matching algorithm in Section VII. We further
study the security properties of the matching algorithm in
Section VIII using a theoretical model. Section IX evaluates
VAuth’s effectiveness. Section X discusses VAuth’s features.
Finally, the paper concludes with Section XI.
II. RELATED WORK
Smartphone Voice Assistants: Many researchers have
studied the security issues of smartphone voice assistants
[2, 4, 9, 10]. They have also demonstrated the possibility of
injecting commands into voice assistants with electromagnetic
signals [4] or with a mangled voice that is incomprehensible
to humans [2]. These practical attack scenarios motivate us to
build an authentication scheme for voice assistants. Petracca
et al. [10] proposed a generic protection scheme for audio
channels by tracking suspicious information flows. This so-
lution prompts the user and requires manual review for each
potential voice command. It thus suffers from the habituation
and satisficing drawbacks since it interrupts the users from
their primary tasks [11].
Voice Authentication: Most voice authentication
schemes involve training on the user’s voice samples and
building a voice biometric [12–15]. The biometric may
depend on the user’s vocal features or cultural backgrounds
and requires rigorous training to perform well. There is
no theoretical guarantee that they provide good security in
general. Approaches in this category project the signal to a
reduced-dimension space and collisions are thus inherent. In
fact, most companies adopt these mechanisms for the usability
benefits and claim they are not as secure as passwords or
patterns [16]. Moreover, for the particular case of voice
assistants, they all are subject to simple replay attacks.
Mobile Sensing: Many researchers have studied the
potential applications of accelerometers for human behavior
analysis [17–20]. Studies show that it is possible to in-
fer keyboard strokes [17], smartphone touch inputs [20] or
passwords [17, 19] from acceleration information. There are
also applications utilizing the correlation between sound and
vibrations [21, 22] for health monitoring purposes. Doctors can
thus detect voice disorder without actually collecting the user’s
daily conversations. These studies are very different from ours
which focuses on continuous voice assistant security.
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Fig. 1. The source–filter model of human speech production using the vowel
{i:} as an example.
III. BACKGROUND
We introduce some basic concepts and terminology regard-
ing the generation and processing of human speech, which
will be referenced consistently throughout the paper.
A. Human Speech Model
The production of human speech is commonly modeled as
the combined effect of two separate processes [23]: a voice
source (vibration of vocal folds) that generates the original
signal and a filter (determined by the resonant properties of
vocal tract including the influence of tongue and lips) that
further modulates the signal. The output is a shaped spectrum
with certain energy peaks, which together maps to a specific
phoneme (see Fig. 1(b) for the vowel {i:} – the vowel in the
word “see”). This process is widely used and referred to as
the source-filter model.
Fig. 1(a) shows an example of a female speaker pronouncing
the vowel {i:}. The time separating each pair of peaks is
the length of each glottal pulse (cycle). It also refers to the
instantaneous fundamental frequency (f0) variation while the
user is speaking, which is the pitch of speaker’s voice. The
value of f0 varies between 80 to 333Hz for a human speaker.
The glottal cycle length (being the inverse of the fundamental
frequency) varies 0.003sec and 0.0125sec. As the human
speaker pronounces different phonemes in a particular word,
the pitch changes accordingly, which becomes an important
feature of speaker recognition. We utilize the fundamental
frequency (f0) as a reference to filter signals that fall outside
of the human speech range.
B. Speech Recognition and MFCC
The de facto standard and probably the most widely used
feature for speech recognition is Mel-frequency cepstral coeffi-
cients (MFCC) [24], which models the way humans perceive
sounds. In particular, these features are computed on short-
term windows when the signal is assumed to be stationary. To
compute the MFCCs, the speech recognition system computes
the short-term Fourier transform of the signal, then scales
the frequency axis to the non-linear Mel scale (a set of
Mel bands). Then, the Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) is
computed on the log of the power spectrum of each Mel band.
This technique works well in speech recognition because it
tracks the invariant feature of human speech across different
users. However, it also opens the door to potential attacks:
by generating mangled voice segments with the same MFCC
feature, an attacker can trick the voice assistant into executing
specific voice commands without drawing any attention from
the user.
IV. SYSTEM AND THREAT MODELS
A. System Model
VAuth consists of two components. The first is an ac-
celerometer mounted on a wearable device which can be
placed on the user’s chest, around the neck or on the facial
area. The second component is an extended voice assistant
that issues voice commands after correlating and verifying
both the accelerometer signal from the wearable device and
the microphone signal collected by the assistant. This system
is not only compatible with smartphone voice assistants such
as Siri and Google Now, but also applies to voice systems
in other domains such as Amazon Alexa and phone-based
authentication system used by banks. We assume the commu-
nications between the two components are encrypted. Attacks
to this communication channel are orthogonal to this work.
We also assume the wearable device serves as a secure token
that the user will not share with others. The latter assumption
is known as security by possession, which is widely adopted
in the security field in the form of authentication rings [25],
wristbands [26], or RSA SecurID. Thus, the problem of
authenticating the wearable token to the user is orthogonal
to VAuth and has been addressed elsewhere [27]. Instead,
we focus on the problem of authenticating voice commands,
assuming the existence of a trusted wearable device.
B. Threat Model
We consider an attacker who is interested in stealing pri-
vate information or conducting unauthorized operations by
exploiting the voice assistant of the target user. Typically, the
attacker tries to hijack the voice assistant of the target user
and deceive it into executing mal-intended voice commands,
such as sending text messages to premium phone numbers or
conducting bank transactions. The adversary mounts the attack
by interfering with the audio channel. This does not assume the
attacker has to be physically at the same location as the target.
It can utilize equipment that can generate a sound on its behalf,
such as radio channels or high-gain speakers. Specifically, we
consider the following three categories of attack scenarios.
Scenario A – Stealthy Attack: The attacker attempts to
inject either inaudible or incomprehensible voice commands
through wireless signals [4] or mangled voice commands [2,
3]. This attack is stealthy in the sense that the victim may not
even be aware of the on-going threat. It is also preferable to
the attacker when the victim has physical control or within
close proximity of the voice assistant.
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Scenario B – Biometric-override Attack: The attacker
attempts to inject voice commands [8] by replaying a previ-
ously recorded clip of the victim’s voice, or by impersonating
the user’s voice. This attack can have a very low technical
barrier: we found that by simply mimicking the victim’s voice,
an attacker can bypass the Trusted Voice feature of Google
Now within five trials, even when the attacker and the victim
are of different genders.
Scenario C – Acoustic Injection Attack: The attacker
can be more advanced, trying to generate a voice that has
a direct effect on the accelerometer [28]. The intention is
to override VAuth’s verification channel with high energy
vibrations. For example, the attacker can play very loud music
which contains embedded patterns of voice commands.
V. VAUTH
We now present the high-level design of VAuth, describe
our prototype implementation with Google Now, and elaborate
on its usability aspects.
A. High-Level Overview
VAuth has two components: (1) a wearable component, re-
sponsible for collecting and uploading the accelerometer data,
and (2) a voice assistant extension, responsible for authenticat-
ing and launching the voice commands. The first component
easily incorporates into existing wearable products, such as
earbuds/earphones/headsets, eyeglasses, or necklaces/lockets.
The usability aspect of VAuth will be discussed later in this
sectiontoken that the user does not share with others. When
a user triggers the voice assistant, for example by saying
“OK, Google” or “Hey, Siri”, our voice assistant extension
will fetch accelerometer data from the wearable component,
correlate it with signals collected from microphone and issue
the command only when there is a match. Fig. 2 depicts the
information flows in our system. To reduce the processing
burden on the user’s device, the matching does not take place
on the device (that runs the voice assistant), but rather at
the server side. The communication between the wearable
component and the voice assistant takes place over Bluetooth
BR/EDR [29]. Bluetooth Classic is an attractive choice as a
communication channel, since it has a relatively high data
rate (up to 2Mbps), is energy-efficient, and enables secure
communication through its pairing procedure.
The design of VAuth is modular and compatible with
most voice assistant systems. One can thus customize any
component in Fig. 2 to optimize functionality, performance
or usability. Here, we elaborate how to integrate this into an
existing voice assistant, using Google Now as an example.
B. Prototype
We first elaborate on our design of the wearable component.
We use a Knowles BU-27135 miniature accelerometer with
the dimension of only 7.92×5.59×2.28mm so that it can
easily fit in any wearable design. The accelerometer uses only
the z-axis and has an analog bandwidth of 11kHz, enough
to capture the bandwidth of a speech signal. We utilize an
Fig. 2. The high-level design of VAuth, consisting of the wearable and the
voice assistant extension.
(a) Wireless (b) Eyeglasses
Fig. 3. Our prototype of VAuth, featuring the accelerometer chip and
Bluetooth transmitter, (a) compared to US quarter coin and (b) attached to a
pair of eyeglasses belonging to one of the authors.
external Bluetooth transmitter that provides Analog-to-Digital
Conversion (ADC) and Bluetooth transmission capabilities to
the voice assistant extension. To reduce energy consumption,
VAuth starts streaming the accelerometer signal only upon
request from the voice assistant. Our prototype communicates
the microphone and accelerometer signals to a Matlab-based
server which performs the matching and returns the result
to the voice assistant. Fig. 3 depicts our wireless prototype
standalone, and attached to a pair of eyeglasses.
Our system is integrated with Google Now voice assistant to
enable voice command authentication. VAuth starts execution
immediately after the start of a voice session (right after “OK
Google” is recognized). It blocks the voice assistant’s com-
mand execution after the voice session ends until the matching
result becomes available. If the matching fails, VAuth kills the
voice session. To achieve its functionality, VAuth intercepts
both the HotwordDetector and the QueryEngine to
establish the required control flow.
Our voice assistant extension is implemented as a standalone
user-level service. It is responsible for retrieving accelerometer
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(a) Earbuds (b) Eyeglasses (c) Necklace
Fig. 4. The wearable scenarios supported by VAuth.
signals from the wearable device, and sending both accelerom-
eter and microphone to our Matlab-based server for analysis.
The user-level service provides two RPC methods, start
and end, which are triggered by the events generated when
the hotword “OK Google” is detected, and when the query
(command) gets executed, respectively. The first event can be
observed by filtering the Android system logs, and we intercept
the second by overriding the Android IPC mechanisms, by
filtering the Intents sent by Google Now. Also, since some
Android devices (e.g., Nexus 5) do not allow two apps to
access the microphone at the same time, we need to stream
the voice signal retrieved by the voice assistant to our user-
level service. We solve this by intercepting the read method
in the AudioRecord class. Whenever Google Now gets the
updated voice data through this interface, it will forward a
copy of the data to our user-level service via another RPC
method.
Note that the modifications and interceptions above are
necessary only because we have no access to the Google Now
source. The incorporation of VAuth is straightforward in the
cases when developers try to build/extend their voice assistant.
C. Usability
VAuth requires the user to wear a security-assisting device.
There are two general ways to meet this requirement. The first
is to ask users to wear an additional device for security, while
the other is to embed VAuth in existing wearable products
that the users are already comfortable with in their daily lives.
We opted for the latter as security has always been a secondary
concern for users [30]. Our prototype supports three widely-
adopted wearable scenarios: earbuds/earphones/headsets, eye-
glasses, and necklace/lockets. Fig. 4 shows the positions of
the accelerometer in each scenario. We select these areas
because they have consistent contact with the user’s body.
While VAuth performs well on all facial areas, shoulders and
the sternal surface, we only focus on the three positions shown
in Fig. 4 since they conform with widely-adopted wearables.
We have conducted a usability survey to study the users’
acceptance of the different configurations of VAuth. We
surveyed 952 individuals using Amazon Mechanical Turk.
We restricted the respondent pool to those from the US with
previous experience with voice assistants. We compensated
each respondent with $0.5 for their participation. Of the
respondents, 40% are female, 60% are employed full-time,
and 67% have an education level of associate degree or above.
Our respondents primarily use voice assistants for information
search (70%), navigation (54%), and communication (47%).
More than half (58%) of them reported using a voice assistant
at least once a week.
Survey Design: We follow the USE questionnaire method-
ology [31] to measure the usability aspects of VAuth. We
use a 7-point Likert scale (ranging from Strongly Disagree to
Strongly Agree) to assess the user’s satisfaction with a certain
aspect or configuration of VAuth. We pose the questions in
the form of how much the respondent agrees with a certain
statement, such as: I am willing to wear a necklace that
contains the voice assistant securing technology. Below, we
report a favorable result as the portion of respondents who
answered a question with a score higher than 4 (5,6,7) on the
7-point scale. Next to each result, we report the portion of
those surveyed, between brackets, who answered the question
with a score higher than 5 (6 or 7).
The survey consists of three main parts that include: de-
mographics and experience with voice assistants, awareness
of the security issues, and the perception towards VAuth. In
Section IX, we will report more on the other usability aspects
of VAuth, such as matching accuracy, energy, and latency.
Security Awareness: We first asked the respondents about
their opinion regarding the security of voice assistants. Ini-
tially, 86% (63%) of the respondents indicate that they think
the voice assistants are secure. We then primed the respondents
about the security risks associated with voice assistants by
iterating the attacks presented in Section IV. Our purpose was
to study the perception of using VAuth from individuals who
are already aware of the security problems of voice assistants.
After the priming, the respondents’ perceptions shifted con-
siderably. 71% (51%) of the respondents indicate that attacks
to voice assistants are dangerous, and 75%(52%) specified that
they would take steps to mitigate the threats. Almost all of the
latter belong to the set of respondents who now regard these
attacks as dangerous to them.
Wearability: In the last part of the survey, we ask the
participants about their preferences for wearing VAuth in any
of the three configurations of Fig. 4. We have the following
takeaways from the analysis of survey responses.
• 70%(47%) of the participants are willing to wear at
least one of VAuth’s configurations to provide security
protection. These respondents are the majority of those
who are strongly concerned about the security threats.
• 48% (29%) of the respondents favored the ear-
buds/earphone/headset option, 38% (23%) favored the
eyeglasses option and 35% (19%) favored the neck-
lace/locket option. As expected, the findings fit the re-
spondents’ wearables in their daily lives. 71% of the
respondents who wear earbuds on a daily basis favored
that option for VAuth, 60% for eyeglasses and 63% for
the necklace option.
• There is no discrepancy in the wearable options among
both genders. The gender distribution of each wearable
option followed the same gender distribution of the whole
respondent set.
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Fig. 5. A breakdown of respondents’ wearability preference by security
concern and daily wearables. Dangerous and Safe refer to participants’
attitudes towards the attacks to voice assistants after they’ve been informed;
the Dangerous category is further split according to the wearables that people
are already wearing on a daily basis; Yes and No refer to whether participants
are willing to use VAuth in at least one of three settings we provided.
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Fig. 6. Pre-processing stage of VAuth’s matching.
• More than 75% of the users are willing to pay $10 more
for a wearable equipped with this technology while more
than half are willing to pay $25 more.
• Respondents were concerned about the battery life of
VAuth. A majority of 73% (81%) can accommodate
charging once a week, 60% (75%) can accommodate
once per 5 days, and 38% (58%) can accommodate
once each three days. In Section IX, we show that the
energy consumption of VAuth matches the respondents’
requirements.
Fig. 5 presents a breakdown of the major findings in our
usability survey. These results demonstrate that users are will-
ing to accept the different configurations of VAuth, especially
when they are concerned about the privacy/security threats and
when VAuth comes in the forms of which they are already
comfortable with.
VI. MATCHING ALGORITHM
The matching algorithm of VAuth (highlighted in Fig. 2)
takes as input the speech and vibration signals along with
their corresponding sampling frequencies. It outputs a decision
value indicating whether there is a match between the two
signals as well as a “cleaned” speech signal in case of a match.
VAuth performs the matching in three stages: pre-processing,
speech segments analysis, and matching decision.
In what follows, we elaborate on VAuth’s matching algo-
rithm using a running example of a male speaker recording
the two words: “cup” and “luck” with a short pause between
them. The speech signal is sampled by an accelerometer
from the lowest point on the sternum at 64kHz and recorded
from a built-in laptop microphone at a sampling frequency of
44.1kHz, 50cm away from the speaker.
A. Pre-processing
First, VAuth applies a highpass filter, with cutoff frequency
at 100 Hz, to the accelerometer signal. The filter removes
all the artifacts of the low-frequency user movement to the
accelerometer signal (such as walking or breathing). We use
100Hz as a cutoff threshold because humans cannot generate
more than 100 mechanical movements per second. VAuth
then re-samples both accelerometer and microphone signals
to the same sampling rate while applying a low-pass filter
at 4kHz to prevent aliasing. We choose a sampling rate of
8kHz that preserves most acoustic features of the speech signal
and reduces the processing load. Thus, VAuth requires an
accelerometer of bandwidth larger than 4kHz. Then VAuth
applies Fig. 6(a) shows both raw signals immediately after
both signals are filtered and resampled. As evident from the
figure, the accelerometer signal has a high-energy spike due
to the sudden movement of the accelerometer (e.g., rubbing
against the skin), and small energy components resulting from
speech vibrations. On the other hand, the speech signal has two
high-energy segments along with other lower-energy segments
corresponding to background noise.
Second, VAuth normalizes the magnitude of both signals
to have a maximum magnitude of unity, which necessitates
removal of the spikes in the signals. Otherwise, the lower-
energy components referring to the actual speech will not
be recovered. The matching algorithm computes a running
average of the signal’s energy and enforces a cut-off threshold,
keeping only the signals with energy level within the moving
average plus six standard deviation levels.
After normalizing the signal magnitude, as shown in the
top plot of Fig. 6(b), VAuth aligns both signals by finding
the time shift that results in the maximum cross correlation
of both signals. Then, it truncates both signals to make them
have the same length. Note that VAuth does not utilize more
sophisticated alignment algorithms such as Dynamic Time
Warping (DTW), since they remove timing information critical
to the signal’s pitch and they also require a higher processing
load. Fig. 6(b) shows both accelerometer and microphone
signals aligned and normalized.
The next pre-processing step includes identification of the
energy envelope of the accelerometer signal and then its
application to the microphone signal. VAuth identifies the
parts of the signal that have a significant signal-to-noise ratio
(SNR). These are the “bumps” of the signal’s energy as shown
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Fig. 7. Per-segment analysis stage of VAuth.
in the top plot of Fig. 6(b). The energy envelope of the signal
is a quantification of the signal’s energy between 0 and 1.
In particular, the portions of the signal with average energy
exceeding 5% of maximum signal energy map to 1, and other
segments map to 0. This results in four energy segments of the
accelerometer signal of Fig. 6(b). The thresholds for energy
detection depend on the average noise level (due to ADC
chip’s sampling and quantization) when the user is silent. We
chose these thresholds after studying our wireless prototype’s
Bluetooth transmitter.
Finally, VAuth applies the accelerometer envelope to the
microphone signal so that it removes all parts from the
microphone signal that did not result from body vibrations,
as shown in the bottom plot of Fig. 6(b). This is the first
real step towards providing the security guarantees. In most
cases, it avoids attacks on voice assistant systems when the
user is not actively speaking. Inadvertently, it improves the
accuracy of the voice recognition by removing background
noise and sounds from the speech signals that could not have
been generated by the user.
B. Per-Segment Analysis
Once it identifies high-energy segments of the accelerom-
eter signal, VAuth starts a segment-by-segment matching.
Fig. 6(b) shows four segments corresponding to the parts of
the signal where the envelope is equal to 1.
For each segment, VAuth normalizes the signal magnitude
to unity to remove the effect of other segments, such as the
effect of the segment s1 in Fig. 6(b). This serves to make the
energy content of each segment uniform, which will elaborate
on later in Section VIII. VAuth then applies the approach of
Boersma [32] to extract the glottal cycles from each segment.
The approach relies on the identification of periodic patterns in
the signal as the local maxima of the auto-correlation function
of the signal. Thus, each segment is associated with a series
of glottal pulses as shown in Fig. 7. VAuth uses information
about the segment and the corresponding glottal pulses to filter
out the segments that do not correspond to human speech
and those that do not match between the accelerometer and
microphone signals as follows.
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Fig. 8. Matching decision stage of VAuth’s matching.
1) If the length of the segment is less than 20ms, the length
of a single phoneme, then VAuth removes the segment
from both accelerometer and microphone signals. Such
segments might arise from sudden noise.
2) If the segment has no identifiable glottal pulses or the
length of the longest continuous sequence of glottal
pulses is less than 20ms (the duration to pronounce a
single phoneme), then VAuth also removes the segment.
Fig. 7(a) shows the segment “s1” at a higher resolution.
It only contains five pulses which could not have resulted
from a speech.
3) If the average glottal cycle of the accelerometer segment
is larger than 0.003sec or smaller than 0.0125sec, then
VAuth removes the segment from both signals. This
refers to the case of the fundamental frequency falling
outside the range of [80Hz, 333 Hz] which corresponds
to the human speech range.
4) If the average relative distance between glottal pulse
sequence between the accelerometer and microphone
segments is higher than 25%, then VAuth removes the
segment from both signals. This refers to the case of
interfered speech (e.g., attacker trying to inject speech);
the instantaneous pitch variations should be similar
between the accelerometer and microphone [33] in the
absence of external interference. For example, it is evi-
dent that the pitch information is very different between
the accelerometer and microphone of Fig. 7(a).
After performing all the above filtering steps, VAuth does
a final verification step by running a normalized cross correla-
tion between the accelerometer and microphone segments. If
the maximum correlation coefficient falls inside the range [-
0.25,0.25], then the segments are discarded. We use this range
as a conservative way of specifying that the segments do not
match (correlation coefficient close to zero). The correlation is
a costlier operation but is a known metric for signal similarity
that takes into consideration all the information of the time-
domain signals. For example, the segment “s4” depicted in
Fig. 7(b) shows matching pitch information and a maximum
cross-correlation coefficient of 0.52.
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C. Matching Decision
After the segment-based analysis finishes, only the “surviv-
ing” segments comprise the final accelerometer and micro-
phone signals. In Fig. 8(a), only the segments “s2” and “s4”
correspond to matching speech components. It is evident from
the bottom plot that the microphone signal has two significant
components referring to each word.
The final step is to produce a matching decision. VAuth
measures the similarity between the two signals by using
the normalized cross-correlation, as shown in the top plot of
Fig. 8(b). VAuth cannot just perform the cross-correlation on
the input signals before cleaning. Before cleaning the signal,
the cross-correlation results do not have any real indication of
signal similarity. Consider the lower plot of Fig. 8(b), which
corresponds to the cross-correlation performed on the original
input signals of Fig. 6(a). As evident from the plot, the cross-
correlation shows absolutely no similarity between the two
signals, even though they describe the same speech sample.
Instead of manually constructing rules that map the cross-
correlation vector to a matching or non-matching decision, we
opted to utilize a machine learning-based classifier to increase
the accuracy of VAuth’s matching. Below, we elaborate on
the three components of VAuth’s classifier: the feature set,
the machine learning algorithm and the training set.
Feature Set: In general, the feature vector comprises
the normalized cross-correlation values (h(t)) of the final
accelerometer and microphone signals. However, we need
to ensure that the structure of the feature vector is uniform
across all matching tasks. To populate the feature vector,
we identify the maximum value of h(t), and then uniformly
sample 500 points to the left and another 500 to the right
of the maximum. We end up with a feature vector containing
1001 values, centered at the maximum value of the normalized
cross-correlation.
Formally, if the length of h(t) is te, let tm = argmax
t
|h(t)|.
Then, the left part of the feature vector is hl[n] =
h(n.tm500 ), 1 < n < 500. The right part of the feature vector
is hr[n] = h(tm +
n.(te−tm)
500 ), 1 < n < 500. The final feature
vector can then be given as h[n] = hl[n]+h(tm).δ[n−501]+
hr[n− 502].
Classifier: We opted to use SVM as the classifier thanks
to its ability to deduce linear relations between the cross-
correlation values that define the feature vector. We utilize
Weka [34] to train an SVM using the Sequential Minimal
Optimization (SMO) algorithm [35]. The SMO algorithm uses
a logistic calibrator with neither standardization nor normaliza-
tion to train the SVM. The SVM utilizes a polynomial kernel
with the degree equal to 1. We use the trained model in our
prototype to perform the online classification.
Training Set: Here, it is critical to specify that our
training set has been generated offline and is user-agnostic;
we performed the training only once. We recorded (more on
that in Section VII) all 44 English phonemes (24 vowels and
20 consonants) from one of the authors at the lower sternum
position using both the accelerometer and microphone. Hence,
we have 44 accelerometer (acc(i)) and microphone (mic(i))
pair of recordings corresponding for each English phoneme.
To generate the training set, we ran VAuth’s matching over all
44× 44 accelerometer and microphone recordings to generate
1936 initial feature vectors, (fv), and their labels as follows:
∀i : 1 ≤ i ≤ 44; ∀j : 1 ≤ j ≤ 44;
fv[j + 44(i− 1)] = match(acc(i),mic(j))
label[j + 44(i− 1)] = 1i=j .
The generated training dataset contains only 44 vectors with
positive labels. This might bias the training process towards
the majority class (label = 0). To counter this effect, we
amplified the minority class by replicating the vectors with
positive labels five times. The final training set contains 236
vectors with positive labels and 1892 vectors with negative
labels. We use this training set to train the SVM, which, in
turn, performs the online classification.
VAuth’s classifier is trained offline, only once and only
using a single training set. The classifier is thus agnostic of
the user, position on the body and language. In our user study
and rest of the evaluation of Section IX, this (same) classifier
is used to perform all the matching. To use VAuth, the user
need not perform any initial training.
After computing the matching result, VAuth passes the
final (cleaned and normalized) microphone signal to the voice
assistant system to execute the speech recognition and other
functionality.
VII. PHONETIC-LEVEL ANALYSIS
We evaluate the effectiveness of our matching algorithm
on phonetic-level matchings/authentications. The International
Phonetic Alphabet (IPA) standardizes the representation of
sounds of oral languages based on the Latin alphabet. While
the number of words in a language, and therefore the sen-
tences, can be uncountable, the number of phonemes in
the English language are limited to 44 vowels and con-
sonants. By definition, any English word or sentence, as
spoken by a human, is necessarily a combination of those
phonemes [36]; A phoneme4 represents the smallest unit of
perceptual sound. Our phonetic-level evaluation represents a
baseline of VAuth’s operation. Table III of Appendix A lists
20 vowels and 24 consonants phonemes, with two words
representing examples of where the phonemes appear.
We study if VAuth can correctly match the English
phoneme between the accelerometer and microphone (true
positives), and whether it mistakenly matches phoneme sam-
ples from accelerometer to other phoneme samples from the
microphone (false positives).
We recruited two speakers, a male and a female, to record
the 44 examples listed in Table III. Each example comprises
two words, separated by a brief pause, both representing
a particular phoneme. We asked the speaker to say both
words, not just the phoneme, as it is easier for the speaker
to pronounce the phoneme in the context of a word. Both
4https://www.google.com/search?q=define:phonemes
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Fig. 9. Analysis of the vibrations received by the accelerometer.
participants were 50cm away from the built-in microphone of
an HP workstation laptop. At the same time, both speakers
were wearing VAuth, with the accelerometer taped to the
sternum. The microphone was sampled at 44100 Hz, and the
accelerometer at 64000 Hz.
A. Accelerometer Energy & Recognition
Phonemes originate from a possibly different part of the
chest-mouth-nasal area. In what follows, we show that each
phoneme results in vibrations that the accelerometer chip
of VAuth can register, but does not retain enough acoustic
features to substitute a microphone speech signal for the
purpose of voice recognition. This explains our rationale for
employing the matching-based approach.
We perform the pre-processing stage of VAuth’s matching
algorithm to clean both accelerometer and microphone signals
for each phoneme. After normalizing both signals to a unity
magnitude, we compute the accelerometer signal’s energy
relative to that of the microphone. Fig. 9(a) depicts the average
relative energy of the vowel and consonants phonemes for both
the female and male speakers.
All phonemes register vibrations, with the minimum relative
energy (14%) coming from the OI (the pronunciation of “oy”
in “boy”) phoneme of the male speaker. It is also clear from
the figure that there is a low discrepancy of average relative
energy between vowels and consonants for the same speaker.
Nevertheless, we notice a higher discrepancy between the two
speakers for the same phoneme. The female speaker has a
shorter distance between the larynx and lowest point of the
sternum, and she has a lower body fat ratio so that the chest
skin is closer to the sternum bone. It is worth noting that the
energy reported in the figure does not represent the energy
at the time of the recording but after the initial processing
and normalization. This explains why in some cases the
accelerometer energy exceeds that of the microphone.
While the accelerometer chip senses considerable energy
from the chest vibrations, it cannot substitute for the micro-
phone. To confirm this, we passed the recorded and cleaned
accelerometer samples of all phonemes for both speakers to
the Nuance Automatic Speaker Recognition (ASR) API [37].
TABLE I
THE DETECTION ACCURACY OF VAuth FOR THE ENGLISH PHONEMES.
microphone accelerometer TP (%) FP (%)
consonants consonants 90 0.2
consonants vowels - 1.0
vowels consonants - 0.2
vowels vowels 100 1.7
all all 94 0.7
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Fig. 10. Examples of tested noise signals.
Fig. 9(b) shows the breakdown of voice recognition accuracy
for the accelerometer samples by phoneme type and speaker.
Clearly, a state-of-the-art ASR engine fails to identify the
actual spoken words. In particular, for about half of the
phonemes for both speakers, the ASR fails to return any result.
Nuance API returns three suggestions for each accelerometer
sample for the rest of the phonemes. These results do not
match any of the spoken words. In only three cases for
consonants phonemes for both speakers, the API returns a
result that matches at least one of the spoken words.
The above indicates that existing ASR engines cannot
interpret the often low-fidelity accelerometer samples, but it
does not indicate that ASR engines cannot be retrofitted to
recognize samples with higher accuracy. This will, however,
require significant changes to deploying and training these
systems. On the other hand, VAuth is an entirely client-side
solution that requires no changes to the ASR engine or the
voice assistant system.
B. Phonemes Detection Accuracy
We then evaluate the accuracy of detecting each phoneme
for each speaker as well as the false positive across phonemes
and speakers. In particular, we run VAuth to match each
accelerometer sample (88 samples — corresponding to each
phoneme and speaker) to all the collected microphone sam-
ples; each accelerometer sample must match only one micro-
phone sample. Table I shows the matching results.
First, we match the consonant phonemes across the two
speakers as evident in the first row. The true positive rate
exceeds 90%, showing that VAuth can correctly match the
vast majority of consonant phonemes. This is analogous to a
low false negative rate of less than 10%. Moreover, we report
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the false positive rate which indicates the instances where
VAuth matches an accelerometer sample to the inappropriate
microphone sample. As shown in the same figure, the false
positive rate is nearly zero.
Having such a very low false positive rate highlights two
security guarantees that VAuth offers. It does not mistake
a phoneme as another even for the same speaker. Recall
that pitch information is widely used to perform speaker
recognition, as each person has unique pitch characteristics
that are independent of the speech. VAuth overcomes pitch
characteristics similarity and is able to distinguish the different
phonemes as spoken by the same speaker.
Moreover, VAuth successfully distinguishes the same
phoneme across the two speakers. A phoneme contains
speaker-independent features. VAuth overcomes these similar
features to effectively identify each of them for each speaker.
The fourth row of Table I shows comparable results when
attempting to match the vowel phonemes for both speakers.
The second and third rows complete the picture of phoneme
matching. They show the matching results of the vowel
phonemes to the consonant phonemes for both speakers. Both
rows do not contain true positive values as there are no
phoneme matches. Nevertheless, one must notice the very
low false positive ratio that confirms the earlier observations.
Finally, the fifth row shows results of matching all the ac-
celerometer samples to all the microphone samples. The true
positive rate is 93%, meaning that VAuth correctly matched
82 accelerometer samples matched to their microphone coun-
terparts. Moreover, the false positive rate was only 0.6%.
C. Idle Detection Accuracy
Last but not least, we evaluate another notion of false
positives: VAuth mistakenly matches external speech to a
silent user. We record idle (the user not actively speaking)
segments from VAuth’s accelerometer and attempt to match
them to the recorded phonemes of both participants. We
considered two types of idle segments: the first contains no
energy from speech or other movements (Fig. 10(a)), while the
other contains significant abrupt motion of the accelerometer
resulting in recordings with high energy spikes (similar to the
spike of Fig. 6(a)). We also constructed a high energy noise
signal with periodic patterns as shown in Fig. 10(b).
We execute VAuth over the different idle segments and
microphone samples and recorded the false matching deci-
sions. In all of the experiments, we did not observe any
occurrence of a false matching of an idle accelerometer signal
to any phoneme from the microphone for both speakers. As
recorded phonemes are representative of all possible sounds
comprising the English language, we can be confident that
the false positive rate of VAuth is zero in practice for silent
users.
VIII. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
In this section, we highlight the effectiveness of the per-
segment analysis of VAuth’s matching algorithm in pre-
venting an attacker from injecting commands. We also show
that our matching algorithm ensures the phonetic-level results
constitute a lower-bound of sentence-level matching. We pro-
vide a formal analysis of this property, which will be further
supported in the next section using real user studies.
A. Model
We analyze the properties of VAuth’s matching algorithm
which takes as inputs two signals f(t) and g(t) originating
from the accelerometer and microphone, respectively. It out-
puts a final matching result that is a function of normalized
cross-correlation of f(t) and g(t): h(t) = f(t)?g(t)E , where
E =
√‖f(t)‖.‖g(t)‖, ? denotes the cross-correlation op-
erator, and ‖· ‖ is the energy of the signal (autocorrelation
evaluated at 0). For the simplicity of the analysis, we will
focus on the most important feature of h(t), its maximum
value. We can then define VAuth’s binary matching function,
v(f, g), as:
v(f, g) =
{
v = 0, if 0 ≤ m = max(|h(t)|) ≤ th
v = 1, if th < m = max(|h(t)|) ≤ 1. (1)
Each of the input signals comprises a set of segments, which
could refer to the phonemes making up a word or words
making up a sentence, depending on the granularity of the
analysis. Let fi(t) and gi(t) be the ith segments of f(t)
and g(t), respectively. We assume that maximum length of
a segment is τ , such that fi(t) = 0, t ∈ (−∞, 0]
⋃
[τ,+∞).
We can then rewrite f(t) as f(t) =
∑n
i=1 fi(t− iτ); the same
applies for g(t).
One can view the cross-correlation operation as sliding
the segments gi(t) of g(t) against those of f(t). The cross
correlation of g(t) and f(t) can be computed as:
hc(t) = f(t) ? g(t) =
n−1∑
i =1
 i∑
j=1
(fj ? gn−i+j(t− (i− 1)τ))

+
n∑
k =1
(fk ? gk(t− (n− 1)τ))
+
1∑
i =n−1
 i∑
j=1
(fn−i+j ? gj(t− (2n− i− 1)τ))
 .
The normalized cross correlation, h(t), is obtained by normal-
izing hc(t) to E =
√‖∑ni=1 fi(t− iτ)‖.‖∑ni=1 gi(t− iτ)‖.
Since the segments of f and g do not overlap each
other (by their definition), the energy of a signal is the
sum of the energies of its components, such that E =√∑n
i=1 ‖fi(t)‖.
∑n
i=1 ‖gi(t‖). Finally, we expand E to ob-
tain the final value of the normalized cross correlation between
f and g as:
h(t) =
hc(t)√∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1 ‖fi(t)‖.‖gj(t)‖
. (2)
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To decide on the final outcome, VAuth computes
max |h(t)|, which, according to the triangle rule, becomes:
max |h(t)| ≤ max |hc(t)|√∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1 ‖fi(t)‖.‖gj(t)‖
. (3)
We assume that the segments’ cross-correlation maximizes
when they are aligned. That is, max(fi ? gj) =
τ∑
t=0
fi(t)gi(t);
otherwise, we can redefine the segments to adhere to this
property. We can then separate the components of Eq. (3) into
different components such as:
(4)
max |h(t)| ≤ 1
E
.max(hl, hm, hr),where
hl = max
i=1...n−1
 i∑
j=1
|fj ? gn−i+j(t)|
 ,
hm = max |fk ? gk(t)|, and
hr = max
i=1...n−1
 i∑
j=1
|fn−i+j ? gj(t)|
 .
The above equation describes how the final outcome is
related to the results of running VAuth on the segments
comprising f(t) and g(t). Two segments fi(t) and gj(t) are
positively matched when their maximum of normalized cross
correlation, mij , is between th and 1. Otherwise, there is a
negative match.
The value of mij can be given as:
mi,j = max
|fi ? gj(t)|
‖fi(t)‖.‖gj(t)‖ . (5)
Let ei,j denote the product of the energies of fi and gj , such
that ei,j = ‖fi(t)‖.‖gj(t)‖. After applying the triangle rule to
Eq. (4), the final outcome m = max |h(t)| can be given as:
(6)
m ≤ 1
E
.max
 max
i=1...n−1
i∑
j=1
mi,n−i+j .ei,n−i+j ,
n∑
k=1
mkk.ekk, max
i=1...n−1
i∑
j=1
mn−i+j,j .en−i+j,j .

It is evident from Eq. (6) how the final outcome of VAuth
depends on computing the maximum of 2n− 1 distinct com-
ponents. Each component,
i∑
j=1
mij .eij , is simply the weighted
average of the outcomes of VAuth when it matches the
included segments. Without loss of generality, let’s consider
the case when n = 2:
m ≤ max
(
m11.e11
E
,
m12.e12 +m21.e21
E
,
m22.e22
E
)
, (7)
where mij are as defined in Eq. (5); m11 and e11 are the
results of matching f1 and g2, m12 and e12 are those of f1
and g1, m21 and e21 are those of f2 and g2, and m22 and e22
are those of f2 and g1.
Given the above model of the final outcome of VAuth as a
function of the segments composing the commands, we study
the properties of VAuth as described below.
B. Per-segment Analysis
Eq. (7) reveals the importance of the per-segment analysis
of VAuth. This step thwarts an attacker’s ability to inject
commands into the voice assistant system. The attacker aims
to inject segments to g(t) that do not bring m below th (so
that VAuth generates a positive match according to Eq. (1)). If
there were no per-segment analysis, an attacker could exploit
matching segments to inject segments that do not match.
The middle component of Eq. (7) explains it. Assuming that
m1,2.e1,2 is large enough, the attacker can inject g2(t) such
that m1,2.e1,2 + m2,1.e2,1 is still large, despite m2,1 being
low. This happens when e2,1 is too low, implying that the
accelerometer did not record the injected segment.
The per-segment analysis of VAuth addresses this issue
using three mechanisms. First, it removes all portions of f(t)
that fall below the running average of the noise level. These
removed portions will not even be part of Eq. (7). So, the
attacker cannot inject commands when the user is silent (no
corresponding accelerometer signal). Second, if the energy
of some segment of f(t) is above the noise level, VAuth
normalizes its magnitude to 1, after removing the spikes. As
such, it aims to make the energies of the segments of f(t)
uniform. The attacker cannot inject a command with very low
energy as it will not be recorded by the microphone of the
voice assistant. This forces e2,1 to be comparable to e1,2.
As a result, a low value of m2,1 reduces the value of m of
Eq. (7).Third, and more importantly, The per-segment analysis
of VAuth nullifies those segments which have their maximum
normalized cross-correlation falling below a threshold (equal
to 0.4 in our evaluation). These segments will not make it to
the final decision stage, and will not be part of Eq. (7).
C. False Positive Rate
The results of Section VII show that the false positive rate
of matching is not zero for the English phonemes. Such a
false positive rate opens up security holes in VAuth. We
show below that while the false positive rate is not zero at
the phonetic level, adding more phonemes to the command
will drive the false positive rate closer to zero. In other words,
the more sounds the user speaks (i.e., the longer the command
is), the lower the false positive rate will be.
To show this, we will take another look at Eq. (6), where
fi and gi represent the phonemes making up the command.
At the phonetic level, a false positive event occurs when
mi,j > th, given that fi does not match gj . As evident from
Eq. (6), when the values of ei,j are roughly uniform which
we ensure from the per-segment analysis, the value of m is
simply an average of the values of mi,j . The final matching
result v(f, g), is a direct function of m. A false positive event
occurs when v(f, g) = 1 or m > th, given that the underlying
accelerometer (f(t)) and microphone (g(t)) signals do not
match.
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There are two cases available in Eq. (6): i < n (the first
and third terms in the max) and i = n (the middle term in the
max). The former case is simple; the final value of m is by
definition a scaled-down version of the mijs. A lower value
of m will lower the false positive rate.
The latter case considers n segments (phonemes) com-
posing the command. A false positive event occurs when
m = 1/n
n∑
k=1
mk,k > th, given that f(t) does not match g(t).
In the case of phonemes false positives, one can view all mi,js
as being drawn from the distribution PM (mi,j) = PM (M =
mi,j |fi 6= gj), where the 6= operator indicates non-matching;
the false positive rate is simply PM (M > th|fi 6= gj). The
false positive rate of the whole command is then equal to
PM (m) = PM (
∑n
k=1mk,k/n > th|f 6= g). Our objective
reduces to showing that PM (m) decays as n increases (i.e.,
more non-matching phonemes are added to the command).
The distribution PM (M = mij) is an arbitrary one that
only satisfies two conditions. First, it is bounded since the
values of mi,j are limited to the interval [0, 1]. Second,
the matching threshold, th, is larger than the mean of the
distribution such that th > E(mi,j). The empirical false
positive distribution P (mi,j) that we estimated in Section VII
satisfies both conditions.
We know from the Hoeffding bound that since mi,j are
bounded, PM (
∑n
k=1mk,k−n.E(m) > t) ≤ e
−2t2
n , for t ≥ 0.
Substituting t = n.th−n.E(m) (which is larger than 0) yields:
PM (
1
n
.
n∑
k=1
mnk > th) ≤ e−2n(th−E(m))2 . (8)
The left-hand side of Eq. (8) is simply the false positive
rate of the command composed of n non-matching phonemes.
Clearly, this false positive rate decays exponentially fast in n.
Our results from the user study further confirm this analysis.
IX. EVALUATION
We now evaluate the efficacy of VAuth in identifying
common voice assistant commands, under different scenarios
and for different speakers. We demonstrate that VAuth de-
livers almost perfect matching accuracy (True Positives, TPs)
regardless of its position on the body, user accents, mobility
patterns, or even across different languages. Moreover, we
elaborate on the security properties of VAuth, demonstrating
its effectiveness in thwarting various attacks. Finally, we report
the delay and energy consumption of our wearable prototypes.
A. User Study
To support the conclusions derived from our model, we
conducted a detailed user study of the VAuth prototype with
18 users and under 6 different scenarios. We tested how
VAuth performs at three positions, each corresponding to
a different form of wearable (Fig. 4) eyeglasses, earbuds,
and necklace. At each position, we tested two cases, asking
the user to either stand still or jog. In each scenario, We
asked the participants to speak 30 phrases/commands (listed in
Table IV of Appendix A). These phrases represent common
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Fig. 11. The detection accuracy of VAuth for the 18 users in the still position.
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Fig. 12. The energy levels of the outlier users (in Fig. 11(c)) compared to
average users. The circles represent commands of the outlier users that VAuth
fails to match.
commands issued to the “Google Now” voice assistant. In
what follows, we report VAuth’s detection accuracy (TPs) and
false positives (FPs) when doing a pairwise matching of the
commands for each participant. We collected no personally
identifiable information from the individuals, and the data
collection was limited to our set of commands and posed no
privacy risk to the participants. As such, our user study meets
the IRB exemption requirements of our institution.
Still: VAuth delivers high detection accuracy (TPs), with
the overall accuracy rate very close to 100% (more than 97%
on average). This indicates most of the commands are correctly
authenticated from the first trial and VAuth does not introduce
a usability burden to the user. The false positive rate is 0.09%
on average, suggesting that very few signals will leak through
our authentication. These false positive events occur because
the per-segment analysis of our matching algorithm removes
all non-matching segments from both signals, which ensures
the security properties of VAuth. In these cases, when the
remaining segments for the microphone signal accidentally
match what the user said and leak through VAuth, the
voice recognition system (Voice-to-Text) fails to pick them
up as sensible voice commands. Fig. 11 shows the overall
distribution of detection results for each scenario.
VAuth performs almost perfect in two wearable scenarios,
eyeglasses and earbuds, but has two outliers regarding the
detection accuracy in the case of the necklace. We looked
into the commands that VAuth fails to recognize and found
they happen when there are significant energy dips in the voice
level. Fig. 12 reports the energy levels of the voice sessions
for our two outlier users compared to the average across users.
This suggests both participants used a lower (than average)
voice when doing the experiments which did not generate
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Fig. 13. The detection accuracy of VAuth for the 18 users in the moving
position.
enough energy to ensure the authentication.
Mobility: We asked the participants to repeat the ex-
periments at each position while jogging. Our algorithm
successfully filters the disturbances introduced by moving,
breathing and VAuth’s match accuracy remains unaffected
(see Fig. 13). In fact, we noticed in certain cases, such as
for the two outliers observed in our previous experiments, the
results are even better. We studied the difference between their
samples in the two scenarios and found both accelerometer and
microphone received significantly higher energy in the jogging
scenario even after we filtered out the signals introduced
by movement. One explanation is users are aware of the
disturbance introduced by jogging and try to use louder voice
to compensate. This observation is consistent across most of
our participants, not just limited to the two outliers.
Language: We translated the list of 30 commands into
four other languages — Arabic, Chinese, Korean and Persian
— and recruited four native speakers of these languages.
We asked the participants to place and use VAuth at the
same three positions. As shown in Fig. 14, VAuth performs
surprisingly well, even though the VAuth prototype was
trained on English phonemes (Section VI-C). VAuth delivers
almost perfect detection accuracy, except for one case, with the
user speaking Korean when wearing eyeglasses. The Korean
language lacks nasal consonants, and thus does not generate
enough vibrations through the nasal bone [38].
B. Security Properties
In Section IV, we listed three types of adversaries against
which we aim to protect the voice assistant systems. VAuth
can successfully thwart attacks by these adversaries through
its multi-stage matching algorithm. Table II lists the protec-
tions offered by VAuth when the user is silent and actively
speaking. Here, we use the evaluation results in Section IX
to elaborate on VAuth’s security features for each attack
scenario and both cases when the user is silent and speaking.
Silent User: When the user is silent, VAuth completely
prevents any unauthorized access to the voice assistant. In
Section VII-C, we evaluate the false positive rate of VAuth
mistakenly classifying noise while the user is silent for all
English phonemes. We show that VAuth has a zero false
positive rate. When the user is silent, the adversary cannot
inject any command for the voice assistant, especially for
scenarios A and B of Section IV. There is an exception,
TABLE II
THE PROTECTIONS OFFERED BY VAuth.
Sce-
nario Adversary Example
Silent
User
Speaking
User
A Stealthy mangled voice,wireless-based 4 4
B BiometricOverride
replay, user
impersonation 4 4
C AcousticInjection
direct
communication,
loud voice
distance
cut-off
distance
cut-off
0 20 40 60
distance (cm)
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
dB
source: 90 dB
source: 82 dB
source: 70 dB
(a) Exposed accelerometer
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60
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80
90
dB
source: 90 dB
source: 82 dB
source: 70 dB
(b) Covered accelerometer
Fig. 15. The magnitude of the sensed over-the-air vibrations by the ac-
celerometer as a function of the distance between the sound source and the
accelerometer.
however, for scenario C; an adversary can employ a very
loud sound to induce vibrations at the accelerometer chip
of VAuth. Note that, since the accelerometer only senses
vibrations at the z-axis, the attacker must make the extra effort
to direct the sound wave perpendicular to the accelerometer
sensing surface. Next, we will show that beyond a cut-off
distance of 30cm, very loud sounds (directed at the z-axis
of the accelerometer) do not induce accelerometer vibrations.
Therefore, to attack VAuth, an adversary has to play a very
loud sound within less than an arm’s length from the user’s
body — which is highly improbable.
We conduct experiments on the cut-off distances in two
scenarios: the first with VAuth exposed and the second with
VAuth covered with cotton clothing. Fig. 15 reports how
the accelerometer chip of VAuth reacts to over-the-air sound
signals of different magnitudes at different distances. In each
of these scenarios, we played a white noise at three sound
levels:5 2x, 4x and 8x the conversation level at 70dB, 82db and
90dB, respectively. The noise is directed perpendicularly to
the sensing surface of the accelerometer. Fig. 15(a) shows the
recorded magnitude of the accelerometer signal as a function
of the distance between the sound source and VAuth when
it is exposed. As evident from the plots, there is a cut-off
distance of 30cm, where VAuth’s accelerometer cannot sense
even the loudest of the three sound sources. For the other
two sounds, the cut-off distance is 5cm. Beyond the cut-off
5http://www.industrialnoisecontrol.com/comparative-noise-examples.htm
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Fig. 16. The flow of the mangling voice analysis.
distance, the magnitude of the recorded signal is the same as
that in a silent scenario. This indicates that an adversary cannot
inject commands with a high sound level beyond some cut-off
distance. These results are consistent with the case of VAuth
covered with cotton, as shown in Fig. 15(b). The cut-off is
still 30cm for the loudest sound. It is worth noting that the
recorded signal at the microphone does not change magnitude
as drastically as a function of the distance. At a distance of 1m
from the sound source, the audio signal loses at most 15dB
of magnitude.
Speaking User: On the other hand, the adversary may
try to launch an attack on the voice assistant system when
the user is actively speaking. Next, we show how VAuth can
successfully thwart the stealthy attacks in scenario A. We will
show, in the most extreme case scenario, how VAuth can
completely distinguish the accelerometer samples of the voice
spoken by the user from the reconstructed sound of the same
command, even when the reconstructed voice sounds the same
to the human listener as the original one.
Vaidya et al. [2, 3] presented an attack that exploits the
gap between voice recognition system and human voice per-
ception. It constructs mangled voice segments that match the
MFCC features of an injected voice command. An ASR engine
can recognize the command, but not the human listener. This
and similar attacks rely on performing a search in the MFCC
algorithm parameter space to find voice commands that satisfy
the above feature.
Performing an exhaustive search on the entire parameter
space of the MFCC generation algorithm is prohibitive. There-
fore, to evaluate the effectiveness of VAuth against such an
attack, we consider its worst-case scenario. Fig. 16 shows the
evaluation flow. For each of the recorded command of the
previous section, we extract the MFCCs for the full signal
and use them to reconstruct the voice signal. Finally, we
execute VAuth over the reconstructed voice segment and the
corresponding accelerometer sample to test for a match.
We fixed the MFCC parameters as follows: 256 samples
for the hop time, 512 samples for the window time, and 77 as
the length of the output coefficient vector. We vary the number
Mel filter bands between 15 and 30. At 15 Mel filter bands, the
reconstructed voice command is similar to what is reported in
existing attacks [2]. At 30 Mel filter bands, the reconstructed
voice command is very close to the original; it shares the same
MFCCs and is easily identifiable when played back.
The question that we aim to address is whether reducing
the sound signal to a set of features and reconstructing back
the original signal preserves all the acoustic features needed
for VAuth to perform a successful matching with the corre-
sponding accelerometer signal. If not, then the reconstructed
sound will not even match the voice it originated from.
Therefore, any mangled voice will not match the user’s speech
as measured by VAuth, so that VAuth could successfully
thwart the attack.
In all cases, while the original microphone signal matches
accelerometer signals near perfectly as indicated before, the
reconstructed sound failed to match the accelerometer signal
in 99% of the evaluated cases. Of 3240 comparisons (2 Mel
filter band lengths per command, 90 commands per user and
18 users), the reconstructed sound matched only a handful
of accelerometer samples, and only in cases where we used
30 Mel filter bands. Indeed, those sound segments were very
close to the original sound segment that corresponds to the
matched accelerometer samples. To constitute an attack, the
mangled voice segment is not supposed to originate from the
sound the user is speaking, let alone preserving discernible
acoustic features. This demonstrates that VAuth matches the
time-domain signals in their entirety, thwarting such attacks
on the voice assistant and recognition systems.
Last but not least, we tested VAuth with the set of mangled
voice commands6 used by Carlini et al. [3]. We asked four
different individuals to repeat these commands while wearing
VAuth. The accelerometer samples corresponding to each
command do not match their mangled voice counterparts.
In scenario B, an attacker also fails to overcome VAuth’s
protection. We indicated earlier in Section VII-B and in this
section that VAuth successfully distinguishes the phonemes
and commands of the same user. We further confirm that
VAuth can differentiate the same phoneme or command
6http://www.hiddenvoicecommands.com/
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Fig. 17. Current levels of the prototype in the idle and active states.
across different users. Moreover, even if the user is speaking
and the adversary is replaying another sound clip of the same
user, VAuth can differentiate between the microphone and
accelerometer samples and stop the attack. Finally, VAuth
might result in some false positives (albeit very low). As
explained earlier, these false positive take place because the
remaining segments after the per-segment stage of VAuth
match, and thus do not represent a viable attack vector. It is
worth noting that VAuth could use a more stringent classifier
that is tuned to force the false positive rate to be 0. This will
come at the cost of usability but could be preferable in high-
security situations.
C. Delay and Energy
We measure the delay experienced at the voice assistant
side and the energy consumption of the wearable component,
using our prototype. As shown in Fig. 2, VAuth incurs delay
only during the matching phase: when VAuth uploads the
accelerometer and microphone signals to the remote service
and waits for a response. According to our test on the same
list of 30 commands, we found that a successful match takes
300–830ms, with an average of 364ms, while an unsuccessful
match takes 230–760ms, with an average of 319ms. The
response time increases proportionally to the length of the
commands, but matching a command containing more than
30 words still takes less than 1 second. We expect the delay
to decrease further if switching from our Matlab-based server
to a full-fledged web server.
When the wearable component transmits accelerometer sig-
nals, it switches between two states: idle state that keeps
the connection alive and active state that actually transmits
the data. We connected our prototype to the Monsoon power
monitor and recorded the current levels of the prototype in
these two states when powered by a fixed voltage (4V). Fig. 17
illustrates the changes of the current levels when our prototype
switches from idle to active and then back to idle. We observed
that under active state, our prototype consumes as much as
31mA, while under idle state, it only consumes an average
of 6mA. Most of the energy is used to keep the Bluetooth
connection and transmit data (in the active state) — the energy
consumed by the accelerometer sensor is almost negligible.
Assuming the user always keeps the wearable open at
daytime and sends 100 voice commands per day (each voice
command takes 10 seconds). Our prototype consumes 6.3mA
on average. This might even be an overestimation since 90%
of the users issue voice commands at most once per day
according to our survey. A typical 500mAh Li-Ion battery used
by wearables (comparable to a US quarter coin) can power
our prototype for around a week. 80% of the participants
in our usability survey think they have no problem with
recharging the wearable on a weekly basis. We conducted all
the analyses on our prototype which directly utilizes off-the-
shelf hardware chips without any optimization, assuming that
VAuth is provided as a standalone wearable. If incorporated
into an existing wearable device, VAuth will only introduce
an additional energy overhead of less than 10mAh per day.
X. DISCUSSION
In our prototype implementation, we enforce the same
policy for all voice commands: if the authentication passes,
execute else drop the command. However, one can imple-
ment customized policy for different commands. For exam-
ple, some commands, such as time/weather inquiry, are not
privacy/security-sensitive, so VAuth can execute them directly
without going through additional authentication process; other
commands, such as controlling home appliances might be
highly sensitive, and hence VAuth should promptly warn the
user instead of simply dropping the command. This can be
implemented by extending the Intent interception logic in our
prototype implementation, making VAuth react differently
according to different Intent actions, data, and types.
Besides its excellent security properties, VAuth has a
distinct advantage over existing technologies — it is wear-
and-use without any user-specific, scenario-dependent training.
Although we used machine learning to facilitate matching
decision in our algorithm, we only trained once (on English
phonemes of a test user) and then applied it in all other cases.
Our evaluation demonstrates that VAuth is robust to changes
in accents, speed of speech, mobility, or even languages. This
significantly increases the usability of VAuth.
XI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed VAuth, a system that
provides continuous authentication for voice assistants. We
demonstrated that even though the accelerometer information
collected from the facial/neck/chest surfaces might be weak,
it contains enough information to correlate it with the data
received via microphone. VAuth provides extra physical as-
surance for voice assistant users and is an effective measure
against various attack scenarios. It avoids the pitfalls of
existing voice authentication mechanisms. Our evaluation with
real users under practical settings shows high accuracy and
very low false positive rate, highlighting the effectiveness of
VAuth. In future, we would like to explore more configura-
tions of VAuth that will promote wider real-world deployment
and adoption.
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APPENDIX A
Here, we list two tables which contain the English language
phonetics as well as their examples and the list of commands
we utilized for evaluating VAuth.
TABLE III
THE IPA CHART OF ENGLISH PHONETICS.7
Vowel Examples Consonants Examples
2 CUP, LUCK b BAD, LAB
A: ARM, FATHER d DID, LADY
æ CAT, BLACK f FIND, IF
e MET, BED g GIVE, FLAG
@ AWAY, CINEMA h HOW, HELLO
3:r TURN, LEARN j YES, YELLOW
I HIT, SITTING k CAT, BACK
i: SEE, HEAT l LEG, LITTLE
6 HOT, ROCK m MAN, LEMON
O: CALL, FOUR n NO, TEN
U PUT, COULD N SING, FINGER
u: BLUE, FOOD p PET, MAP
AI FIVE, EYE r RED, TRY
AU NOW, OUT s SUN, MISS
eI SAY, EIGHT S SHE, CRASH
oU GO, HOME t TEA, GETTING
OI BOY, JOIN tS CHECK, CHURCH
e@r WHERE, AIR T THINK, BOTH
I@r NEAR, HERE D THIS, MOTHER
U@r PURE, TOURIST v VOICE, FIVE
- - w WET, WINDOW
- - z ZOO, LAZY
- - Z PLEASURE, VISION
- - dZ JUST, LARGE
TABLE IV
THE LIST OF COMMANDS.8
Command Command
1. How old is Neil deGrasse Tyson? 16. Remind me to buy coffee at 7am from Starbucks
2. What does colloquial mean? 17. What is my schedule for tomorrow?
3. What time is it now in Tokyo? 18. Where’s my Amazon package?
4. Search for professional photography tips 19. Make a note: update my router firmware
5. Show me pictures of the Leaning Tower of Pisa 20. Find Florence Ion’s phone number
6. Do I need an umbrella today? What’s the weather
like? 21. Show me my bills due this week
7. What is the Google stock price? 22. Show me my last messages.
8. What’s 135 divided by 7.5? 23. Call Jon Smith on speakerphone
9. Search Tumblr for cat pictures 24. Text Susie great job on that feature yesterday
10. Open greenbot.com 25. Where is the nearest sushi restaurant?
11. Take a picture 26. Show me restaurants near my hotel
12. Open Spotify 27. Play some music
13. Turn on Bluetooth 28. What’s this song?
14. What’s the tip for 123 dollars? 29. Did the Giants win today?
15. Set an alarm for 6:30 am 30. How do you say good night in Japanese?
7copied from: http://www.antimoon.com/resources/phonchart2008.pdf
8inspired from: http://www.greenbot.com/article/2359684/android/a-list-
of-all-the-ok-google-voice-commands.html
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